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KENTUCY LAW JoURNAL
concept of "practice of law" to specific situations. Necessarily broad,
practice of law too often has meaning only ex post facto. Recognizing
that a region exists wherein the functions of attorney and layman
overlap, the courts seek to regulate the practice of law in a common
sense way so as not to unduly burden the public interest with
impractical technical restraints no matter how sound logically. In the
field of legal instrument drafting the overlap is particularly trouble-
some. One of the few, perhaps the only, valid, workable methods of
defining the boundary which separates the authorized from the
unauthorized has been the "substantial interest doctrine". A fixture
insofar as individuals are concerned, the doctrine is currently defunct
in Kentucky as applied to corporations. Whereas it is conceded that
in a limited application the prohibition against corporate preparation
of legal instruments is sound, the renunciation of the substantial
interest exception creates more and greater problems than it cures.
Maxwell P. Barret, Jr.
ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS:
A SOLUTION AND CONTINUING PROBLEMS
Obtaining a judgment or settlement through litigation or nego-
tiation in any legal matter is usually considered a satisfactory con-
clusion to the attorney's efforts; but, if the client is a wife and mother
seeking a decree for child support from her husband, obtaining a
judgment often marks the beginning rather than the end of difficulties.
The wife is faced with the continuing problem of enforcing a child
support decree against a father who has left the state and who refuses
to support his minor children. In spite of legislation designed to
remedy the situation, a husband can still, "by the simple method of
crossing state lines . . . effectively prevent his dependents from
enforcing family support obligations."1 In Hamilton v. Hamilton,
2
the Kentucky Court of Appeals employs an unusual but effective means
of collecting support payments from an affluent husband and father,
living outside the state, who refuses to continue making these pay-
ments in the amount decreed by the Jefferson County Circuit Court.
The opinion of the Court serves both as one solution to the problem
and as a means of underscoring many additional difficulties one may
1 Murphy, Uniform Support Legislation, 43 Ky. L.J. 98, 111 (1954).
2 476 S.W.2d 197 (Ky. 1972).
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generally expect to face in seeking to obtain or to enforce a child
support decree.3
The facts of the Hamilton case are not complicated, although the
litigation extends over a period of some twelve years in which the
appellant tried with little success to collect support payments from
her absentee husband on behalf of their daughter. Jack and Eugenia
Hamilton agreed upon a divorce settlement in 1960; Eugenia retained
custody of their four year old daughter and waived her claim to
alimony in exchange for Jack's agreement to pay $200 per month for
child support. In 1964, Jack Hamilton filed a motion to reduce the
amount of support payments, but his request was denied. By this
time, however, Jack had left Kentucky and was living in Florida.
Outside the jurisdiction of the court, he summarily reduced his pay-
ments from $200 to $75 per month. Eugenia sought to have her
Kentucky judgment enforced in Florida under the Uniform Support
of Dependents Act 4 only to find that Florida, as the responding state,
would neither extradite Jack nor force him to pay more than the $75
per month that he had been paying for some time. By 1970, Jack
Hamilton had moved to New Jersey and was working for the St.
Regis Paper Company in New York City at an annual salary of over
$20,000. Relying upon the fact that the St. Regis Paper Company
also does business in Kentucky, Eugenia Hamilton obtained a garnish-
ment5 of Jack's wages from his employer as garnishee at its Kentucky
office. Reversing the lower court's reduction of monthly payments in
the proceedings involving the garnishment of Jack's wages and
expanding upon a determination of the amount in arrearage and the
amount permitted to be garnished, the Court made clear its policy
that an absentee father's wages could be attached to satisfy a support
judgment if he works for a corporation over which the courts of this
state have personal jurisdiction.
3 The problem is so acute that at least one writer has suggested that federal
legislation in the area may be required to cope with it. Note, Domestic Relations:
Interstate Enforcement of Support Orders: Necessity and Feasibility of Federal
Legislation, 48 CORNELL L. Rrv. 541 (1963).
4 The applicable statutes of both Florida and Kentucky are based upon the
UNwonm Rmcn, rtocAL ENFoRcEMENT OF SUPPORT AcT, 9C UNo. LAWS ANN. 1
(1968) [hereinafter cited as URESA]. The act was drafted in its basic form in
1950 and subsequently amended in 1952, 1958, 1962, and 1968. The statutes in
Kentucky and Florida are based on the 1952 amendment, as are the statutes in
most other states. The statutes applicable to the Hamilton case are Ky. REv. STAT.
ch. 407 (1971) [hereinafter cited as KRS] and Fr. STAT. ANN. ch. 88 (1964).
The title UNIFortM SUPPORT OF DEPENDENTS AcT in Kentucky is a holdover from
earlier legislation formerly in effect in this state; all but the name has been sup-
planted by URESA.
5 The basic statutory provision in Kentucky governing garnishment is Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 425.190 (1969) [hereinafter cited as KRSA].
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The decision in the Hamilton case is on quite solid ground, although
only one case is cited by the Court in its opinion.0 The Court might
have articulated more completely the basis for its decision since the
principle is well established in a long line of cases, including the
landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court in Harris v.
Balk,7 that a creditor may collect by garnishment any or all of his
debt from any debtor of his debtor present in the state, provided his
debtor could have sued the garnishee in the state as well.8 A recent
decision citing this principle as set forth in Balk is almost directly in
point with the Hamilton case. In Garrett v. Garrett,9 the Colorado
Court of Appeals upheld a garnishment of wages from the employer
of a husband who had failed to satisfy a judgment arising out of
a divorce. In this case, as in Hamilton, the husband had left the state,
but his wages were garnished at the Denver office of the Washington
State corporation for which he worked. Citing the Balk decision,'0
the Colorado court held that the corporation, having brought itself
within the jurisdiction of the court by doing business within the state,
was liable in garnishment proceedings for the wages it owed a judg-
ment debtor in the state."
The holding of the Balk case referred specifically to a lump sum
debt, but courts have applied that holding, as in Garrett, to cases in
which garnishment of wages is involved. Once the right of the creditor
is established, it is clear that uncollected wages are as susceptible to
garnishment as any other debt.' 2 There is certainly in personam
6 Pittsburgh, C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. Bartels, 56 S.W. 152 (Ky. 1900) does appear
directly in point on the matter of garnishment in circumstances such as those in
Hamilton. It has not been overruled, of course, and thus has a great deal of value
as precedent in Kentucky in spite of its age.
7 198 U.S. 215 (1905). For an early case involving satisfaction of a divorce
decree judgment through garnishment of a bank account see Pennington v. Fourth
Natl Bank, 243 U.S. 269 (1917).
8 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 provides: "The Citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." Under
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Balk could have sued Harris in Maryland to
collect a debt contracted in North Carolina. Consequently, Balk's creditor, one
Epstein, upon discovering Harris in Maryland, was able to garnish Harris debt to
Balk in partial satisfaction of Balk's debt to Epstein. See Note, The Continuing
Impact of the Doctrine of Harris v. Balk, 4 NEw ENO. L. BEv. 207, 209 (1969).
9 490 P.2d 313 (Colo. 1971).
1T Colorado court relies upon the following language from the Balk case:
If there be a law of the state providing for the attachment of the debt,
then, if the garnishee be found in that state, and process be personally
served upon him therein, we think the court thereby acquires jurisdic-
tion over him, and can garnish the debt due from him to the debtor of
the plaintiff and condemn it, provided the garnishee could himself be
sued by his creditor in that state.
Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 222 (1905), cited in Garrett v. Garrett, 490 P.2d
313, 314-15 (Colo. 1971).
"1 Garrett v. Garrett, 490 P.2d 318, 315 (Colo. 1971).
12 Note, Wage Garnishment in Kentucky, 57 Ky. L.J. 92, 95 (1968).
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jurisdiction over the corporation in Hamilton since the St. Regis Paper
Company has an agent for service of process and carries on business
activities in Kentucky. Indeed, combining the holdings of the Supreme
Court in Balk and in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,13 in which
the Court announced the "minimum contacts" rationale for satisfying
due process requirements where in personam jurisdiction is in ques-
tion,14 it is evident that even wvithout an agent for process or a regular
business establishment in Kentucky, the Court might well have per-
mitted St. Regis to be served in a garnishment proceeding. It could
have employed the Balk rationale that a debtor, even temporarily
in the state, may be served in a garnishment proceeding subject only
to the limitation that the third-party creditor may obtain a judgment
only where his debtor could also have sued the garnishee on the debt
in the state.15 The Court did not have to go so far in Hamilton, but
it is interesting to note that it could have; the Court was well within
orthodox limits in Hamilton, as was the Colorado court in Garrett,
decided some two months earlier.16 An employee may sue his em-
ployer to collect his wages wherever the employer may be served with
process, and consequently, the employee's creditors, including his wife
and children in possession of a support order, may also sue the
employer as garnishee in order to attach the employee's wages in
satisfaction of the debt.
17
13 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
14 Id. at 316. The language has been often quoted but is worthy of repetition:
[Dlue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judg-
ment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum,
he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.'
15Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 222 (1905). In a case that predates even
Balk, Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Sturm, 174 U.S. 710 (1899), the Supreme Court
held that a debt not specially limited is owed everywhere and could be sued on
wherever the debtor is to be found. In Pittsburgh, C.C. & St. L. ly. v. Bartels,
56 S.W. 152 (Ky. 1900), the case cited by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in its
opinion in Hamilton, the Court held that a corporation submits itself to the
jurisdiction of the court for garnishment purposes to the same extent as a domestic
corporation when it becomes licensed to do business in the state. In Baltimore &
0. R.R. v. Allen, 52 S.E. 465 (W. Va. 1905), the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia held that a foreign corporation doing business in the state may be
subject to garnishment just as any natural person residing in the state. The case
law in this area is generally quite old, for the holdings in many of the cases have
become settled principles of law in the jurisdictions to which they apply.
16 One might cite any number of cases involving corporate garnishees in which
Harris v. Balk is treated as "academic." See, e.g., Goldberg v. Southern Builders,
Inc., 184 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1950) and Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Willett Associates,
219 A.2d 718 (Conn. 1966).
17 In Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Sturm, 174 U.S. 710 (1899), an employee of a
railroad sued for his wages in Kansas only to find that they had already been
attached to satisfy a debt in Iowa and that the Kansas court was obliged to give
full faith and credit to the Iowa judgment.
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In addition to delineating the Court's interesting method of en-
forcing a support judgment against Jack Hamilton, the Hamilton case
serves to bring into focus many other problems in enforcing obligations
of support against recalcitrant husbands and fathers. How effective,
for example, is garnishment in enforcing support judgments against
absentee fathers? What other methods are available for obtaining
support payments?
The answer to the first question is that, generally, garnishment
is an ineffective remedy for enforcing a support judgment against a
reluctant father.18 The "runaway pappy"19 is seldom likely to offer
his wife and children the opportunity to attach his wages so readily.
If he works at all, he probably does not work for a corporation subject
to in personam jurisdiction in Kentucky. It is largely because Jack
Hamilton enjoyed an executive position and a five figure income and
thus could not afford to "drift" to another job that Eugenia Hamilton
was finally able to obtain a satisfactory remedy through garnishment.
The facts in Hamilton are close to extraordinary for cases of this sort.
Had Jack been a typical drifting absentee father, he would probably
have "moved on" once the garnishment had been effected, and his
wife would have had either to settle for the wages from a single pay
period 20 or to begin the difficult process of garnishing wages from a
new employer, if Jack's new residence could be ascertained and if the
new employer were subject to garnishment in Kentucky.
It might be asked, of course, why the judgment creditor does not
simply take her Kentucky support judgment to the court of the state
where the judgment debtor may be found for enforcement by the
court. Under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act,
in effect in most states, she may do this-often with dubious results.
One might reasonably ask why such an act is necessary; what of the
constitutional mandate that judgments from one state be given full
38 Unless the defendant is coerced by the embarrassment of garnishment into
voluntarily complying with the provisions of the judgment against him, the
necessity of filing successive garnishment orders to collect the support payments
as both wages and payments come due may make the remedy less attractive than
it seems at first. See Note, 57 Ky. L.J. 92, supra note 12, at 101. Of course, the
disadvantages of having to get successive orders is outweighed by the advantage in
Hamilton of being able at last to collect something.
19 W. BROCKELBANK, INTERSTATE ENFoRCEm:ENT OF FAMLY SUPPORT (1960).
The phrase is borrowed from the subtitle of Brockelbank's book. The book is a
comprehensive treatment of URESA and includes a discussion of the problems of
collecting support from fathers who desert their families as well as those who seek
to avoid support decrees.
20 Note, 57 Ky. L.J. 92, supra note 12, at 101. It is one of the severe limitations
of garnishment that it is effective only for the pay period for which the order
of garnishment is entered. To satisfy a judgment for a greater sum, successive
orders of garnishment are required.
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faith and credit in the courts of every other state?21 The problem is a
judicially-imposed interpretation of the Constitution, extending full
faith and credit only to final judgments of state courts.22 The Supreme
Court holding, which has controlled for decades the application of any
constitutional requirement that full faith and credit be given to judg-
ments arising out of alimony and support cases, is Sistare v. Sistare.23
The problem, recognized by the Supreme Court in Sistare, is that a
court giving full faith and credit to the judgment of a sister court in
another state should not have its implementation of that judgment
subject to modification by the court in the original jurisdiction. A
decree for support must be given full faith and credit as installments
come due if the judgment is finalized, but, where statute or the
decree itself make its terms modifiable, full faith and credit does not
obtain.2
4
A number of courts have recognized, however, that the Sistare
holding does not prevent states from enforcing the modifiable support
and alimony decrees of other courts; it merely states that courts are
not required to enforce such judgments. Under the doctrine of
comity,25 courts have provided judgment creditors with equitable
relief, at least to the extent of accrued payments, although there has
been a general reluctance to deal with future installments of a
modifiable support decree.26 Some state courts have in recent years
gone considerably beyond such limited enforcement of alimony and
support decrees, extending full faith and credit and enforcing decrees
as to future support payments.27  The Supreme Court of Illinois
21 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 provides in pertinent part: "Full Faith and Credit
shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings
of every other State." The enabling legislation is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1738
(1970).
22 For a full discussion of the problems inherent in the requirement of
finality of judgment for application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and a
consideration of increasingly liberal application of the requirement, see Note, The
Full Faith and Credit Clause Reanalyzed: The Finality Doctrine Denounced-
Judicial Proceedings Redefined, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 211 (1959).
25218 U.S. 1 (1910).
24 Id. at 17.
25 For a general discussion of the doctrine of comity, see 16 AM. JuR.2d Con-
flict of Laws §§ 4-7 (1964). Generally speaking, comity is the courteous extension
of recognition by one state's courts to the judgment of courts in another state when
such recognition is not required. It is a reciprocal courteous recognition and may
not be demanded as a "right." See also, Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 856 (1951).
26 Glanton v. Renner, 149 S.W.2d 748 (Ky. 1941). In this decision, the Court
enforced an Illinois judgment for accrued support payments but refused to enforce
future payments provided for under the decree on the grounds that they were
subject to modification by the Illinois court.
27 Light v. Light, 147 N.E.2d 34 (MII. 1958). See also People ex rel. Franks v.
Franks, 261 N.E.2d 502 (IMI. 1970); Hatch v. Hatch, 431 P.2d 832 (Ore. 1967);
Hudson v. Hudson, 178 A.2d 202 (N.J. 1961).
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indicated in its opinion in Light v. Light that the strong policy con-
siderations for not permitting a judgment debtor to elude his responsi-
bilities in a support case demand that support decrees be given ful
faith and credit in spite of the Sistare decision.
Policy considerations argue strongly that such decrees are en-
titled to full faith and credit. Unless they receive interstate recog-
nition, the insulated judicial systems of the several states may be-
come sanctuaries within which obligations that have been fully
and fairly adjudicated in another jurisdiction may be escaped.28
If all-or even many-state courts were willing to go as far as the
Light decision in Illinois, divorced wives and dependent children
would have far fewer problems in obtaining support payments. But
until there is unanimous adoption of the position of the Illinois court
or adequate uniform legislation, the judgment creditor in such cases
is left at the mercy of the judgment debtor's decision to travel to a
state where the courts have decided to apply Sistare broadly and at
best to enforce modifiable decrees in piecemeal fashion under the
comity rationale.29 One solution to the problem might well be a
reinterpretation by the Supreme Court of its position on such cases;
another solution could be a modification by Congress of legislation
implementing the full faith and credit clause, changing the "finality"
doctrine to a "conclusive" doctrine.30
In recognition of the seriousness of the problem at band, an attempt
has been made to reach a solution through uniform state legislation.31
As the experience of Eugenia Hamilton indicates, however, an attempt
to enforce a judgment under URESA can be most unsatisfactory.
32
Under URESA, the judgment creditor applies to the state in which
the judgment debtor under the support decree is residing for enforce-
ment of the judgment. The responding state is to grant a hearing and,
if it finds the father liable for support of his dependents, the responding
state will determine the amount to be collected, use its own means
to collect that amount, and then send the money to the initiating
28 Light v. Light, 147 N.E.2d 34, 39 (III. 1958).
29 It has been noted that "without constitutional or statutory compulsion, how-
ever, this modem approach is left to the discretion of state courts too often steeped
in tradition to employ it, and remains at best but a possible future remedy for a
real and present problem." Note, 48 CORNELL L. REv'. 541, supra note 3, at 546.
30 Id. See also Note, Interstate Enforcement of Modifiable Alimony and Child
Support Decrees, 54 IowA L. REv. 597 (1969), in which the writer discusses the
problems inherent in haphazard application of the overly broad interpretation of
the Sistare holding and suggests that the Court might be persuaded to change its
position in regard to this limited and specialized category of cases.
33 URESA, supra note 4. The Kentucky statute is based on the 1952 amend-
ment.3 2 Hamilton v. Hamilton, 476 S.W.2d 197, 199 (Ky. 1972).
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court to be given to the judgment creditor.33 In Hamilton, this pro-
cedure netted only $75 per month on a $200 per month support decree
-the amount Jack Hamilton had been paying for some time-because
Florida was willing only to enforce that much of the decree. Such
problems are myriad under URESA. In most cases the wife or child
is represented in the responding state by the county prosecutor's
office, and her claim often takes a low priority among other (local)
matters to be handled by the prosecutor.
34
Greeted with a great deal of enthusiasm 35 as well as numerous
questions concerning its constitutionality36 when first introduced,
URESA has proven to be no threat to the due process rights of non-
supporting fathers and far less than a complete answer to the problem
of enforcing support decrees. The wife and minor children must
have their claim evaluated in a distant forum and, unless they can
bear the expense of traveling there, the hearing takes place without
their having an opportunity to testify in their own behalf. They must
have the claim handled in an office attuned to local politics by someone
who is usually less than totally committed to the cause of a "client"
whom he has met only by way of the file forwarded by the initiating
court. It is small wonder that when Jack Hamilton informed the
Florida court that he had for two years been paying $75 per month
child support, the court agreed to enforce only that portion of the $200
per month judgment. He was able to appear personally before the
Florida court to plead his cause, while his wife and daughter were
forced to wait in Louisville for the outcome of a hearing to determine
whether they would receive the support payments to which they were
entitled. Under both the full faith and credit clause as limited by
Sistare and URESA, the wife and minor children are faced with un-
certainty, delay, and legal expense in obtaining support. It seems that
any such remedy which depends upon cooperation between the courts
of two jurisdictions necessarily involves expensive and lengthy pro-
ceedings without certainty of success. Clearly a more certain remedy
is needed.
Such a remedy may very well lie in the application of the "minimum
33 Note, 48 ConNELI. L. REv. 541, supra note 3, at 546.
34 Nelson, Family Support From Fugitive Fathers: A Proposed Amendment to
Michigan's Long Arm Statute, 3 PRosPEcrus 399, 405 (1970). The author notes
that in Michigan, for example, some forty percent of URESA cases filed with
county prosecutors' offices by non-resident plaintiffs are never pursued (based on
the results of a questionnaire sent to county prosecutors in the state).
35 Murphy, supra note 1.36 Harmon v. Harmon, 184 Cal. App.2d 245, 7 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1960), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 270 (1960); Smith v. Smith, 125 Cal. App.2d 440, 270 P.2d 618
(1954); Duncan v. Smith, 262 S.W.2d 373 (Ky. 1953).
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contacts" doctrine to support casesa3 and the use of state "long arm"
statutes 38 both to obtain and to enforce support judgments.3 9 This
method would be most effective in obtaining a judgment (not merely
enforcing a judgment as in the Hamilton case) when in personam
jurisdiction over the absentee father is lacking, but long arm jurisdiction
might also be employed to obtain a judgment in lump sum for
arrearage-a judgment enforceable in another jurisdiction without the
additional hearing that creates so much difficulty under URESA.
Perhaps the earliest decision employing the "minimum contacts"
doctrine in a divorce action 40 is Soule v. Soule.41 The California Dis-
trict Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held in that case, even
without a specific provision in the California long arm statute, that
jurisdiction to render a personal judgment for support against the
husband was acquired where the cause of action of a divorce pro-
ceeding arose while the husband was domiciled in the state, even
though he had left the state and was served with process in Montana.
The court makes reference to the California long arm statute without
ever indicating how the statute is specifically applicable. The court
reasons that the divorce cause of action is analogous to a case in
which an individuars commission of a single tortious action brings him
within the intent of the statute.42 The rationale is that having lived in
the marital relationship within the state provides sufficient contact to
justify extending personal jurisdiction without offending "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice."43
In Mizner v. Mizner,44 the Supreme Court of Nevada upheld a
California judgment for divorce and support against a defendant who
had been married and living in California and who moved to Nevada
where he was served with process. The defendant appealed to the
Nevada courts, but they upheld the California application of a
37 Comment, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 361 (1968).38Annot., 7'8 A.L.B.2d 397 (1961). A long arm statute extends the in
personam jurisdiction of a state to a nonresident person or corporation on the
basis of some contact with the state at the time a cause of action arose, for
example, being involved in an automobile accident in the state or committing a
tortious act in the state. For the Kentucky statute see, KRSA § 454.210 (1969).39 Anderson, Using Long-Arm Jurisdiction to Enforce Marital Obligations, 42
Miss. L.J. 183 (1971); Friedman, Extension of the Illinois Long Arm Statute:
Divorce and Separate Maintenance, 16 DE PAvL L. Brv. 45 (1966); Comment, 10
WAsnBBN L.J. 487 (1971). These articles are among the more recent discussions
of the subject; there is a wealth of commentary available, indicating the current
interest in this use of long arm legislation.
40 10 WASaBuRN L.J. 487, supra note 39, at 490.
41 193 Cal. App.2d 443, 14 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1961).
42 Id. at -, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 418-19.
43 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), quoting
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
44439 P.2d 679 (Nev. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968).
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"minimum contacts" rationale for extending jurisdiction and granted
full faith and credit to the judgment.
45
California led the way in applying a conventional long arm statute
to marital litigation, but a number of other states have now gone
even further. They have enabled their courts to extend in personam
jurisdiction more easily in such cases by enacting specific provisions
in their long arm statutes to the effect that one who lives in a state
in the marital relationship submits himself to the jurisdiction of that
state for causes of action arising out of the marital relationship even
if he subsequently leaves the state.46 If the husband leaves his family
without benefit of legal separation, he may be served with process by
registered mail at his last known address with an endorsement from
the office of the Secretary of State that process has been served,47 and
a default judgment is obtained if the defendant fails to answer. In a
test of the earliest such provision in Kansas, the statute was upheld
by the Kansas Supreme Court as not violative of the defendant's right
to "due process."48 But the absence of a United States Supreme Court
determination and the potential for variation in such provisions make
this an area of likely litigation for some time to come.
A similar amendment to the Kentucky long arm statute49 would be
of little use to someone such as Eugenia Hamilton who already has a
support judgment, although as indicated earlier it could prove po-
tentially useful for enforcing a lump sum judgment for arrearage. But
under the circumstances in many cases of non-support in which the
husband simply disappears, the wife is left with no remedy in the way
of getting even a judgment, much less actually enjoying enforcement
of that judgment. A specific long arm provision would provide such
a plaintiff with the judgment she needs as well as providing her with
a means of taking a finalized lump sum arrearage judgment to another
state for enforcement without an additional hearing in that state.
But the remedy would still be ineffective to establish continuing pay-
45 Id. at 682.
46 The following is a complete list to date of such provisions, including those
established through rules of procedure in Indiana and Ohio. The statutes vary
considerably, from ones which place restrictions of continued residency on the
part of a judgment creditor to a fairly unlimited extension of jurisdiction to anyone
who has ever lived in the marital relationship in the state. IDAHo CoDE ANN.
§ 5-514(e) (supp. 1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 § 17(1)(e) (Smith-Hurd,
1968); INn. R. oF Pnoc. TR 4.4(A)(7) (Supp. 1970); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
60-808(b) (8) (1964); NT. REv. STAT. § 14.065 (1969); Omo R. Crv. P. CR 4.3
(Baldwins 1971); OLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1701.03 (1971); UTAH CoDE ANN.
§ 78-27-24 (Supp. 1969); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 247.055(lm) and § 247.057 (1967).
47KBSA § 454.210(3) (1969) is representative of provisions by which
process is actually served under a long arm statute.48 Scott v. Hall, 454 P.2d 449 (Kan. 1969).
49 KRSA § 454.210 (1969).
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ments as called for under the support judgment. There is no satis-
factory solution currently available to solve this problem. The wife
and children must find a way to obtain a judgment and find a way to
enforce it-through equitable enforcement under comity, URESA, or
through garnishment proceedings if the father happens to work for a
corporation subject to suit in Kentucky. It is a collage of uncertainty
that faces a plaintiff already burdened with emotional strain.
The first thing that should be assured is that a judgment at least
can be obtained. Kentucky should adopt an amendment to its long
arm statute extending jurisdiction in personam based upon a person's
'living in the marital relationship in the state notwithstanding sub-
sequent departure from the state, as to all obligations arising for
alimony, child support, or property settlement." If the husband
cannot be located, substituted service should result in a default judg-
ment as already provided in the statute. An awareness that certain
judgment awaits their dropping from sight should discourage many
fathers from deserting their families.
The answer for the judgment creditor, however judgment is
obtained, is an adequate means of enforcement in foreign courts.
Federal legislation under the full faith and credit clause seems a far
better approach than URESA.51 If the Congress could put support
judgments in a special class of modifiable judgments that must be
enforced in the interests of justice, the attitude of the Light decision
in Illinois could be enforced nationwide. The burden of supporting
many dependent children could then be shifted from the public
welfare rolls to those individuals whose responsibility it is to bear
that burden.
Adequate comprehensive legislation is ultimately the only satis-
factory solution to the problem of enforcing support decrees. While
awaiting such legislation, the broadest possible application of the Balk
rationale should be implemented in cases such as Hamilton where the
absentee father's employer can be reached as a garnishee in any way.
An adequate answer is overdue, but the Hamilton decision is one step
in the right direction in Kentucky.
David C. Fannin
5Te language is borrowed in part from the earliest such provision, KAx.
STAT. ANN. § 60-308(b)(8) (1964), omitting the restriction that the plaintiff
continue to reside in the state, a limitation that is open to the interpretation of the
necessity of "continuous" residence. The broadest provision consistent with the
Constitution should be adopted.
51 Suggested in part by Note, 48 ComEmL L. REv. 541, supra note 3.
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